| Document Type: Discretionary - DoD Document Title: DoD 5200.1 -- PH-2; Hostile Intelligence Threat -- U.S.
Technology; November 1988 DoD
5200.1 -- PH-2 Department of Defense This publication outlines the hostile intelligence threat to U.S.
industry and Western technology, including the operational capabilities of
hostile intelligence services and their scientific and technological
(S&T) targets. Current intelligence strategies used against the United
States are described and sources of information providing countermeasures
guidance are listed. Points of contact for security and
counterintelligence assistance have also been included. Acknowledgment This publication was prepared in the Office of the Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security) by Robert D.
Davidson, United States Air Force Security Specialist Intern, from a
variety of sources, which include: -- Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A
review of the United States Counterintelligence and Security Programs, report
of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, October
1986. -- A Report on Foreign Espionage in the
United States, United States Department of State, March 1987. -- Soviet Acquisition of Militarily
Significant Western Technology: An Update, September 1985. -- The Sentinels of Freedom, The American
People and the Defense of the Nation’s Secrets, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, April 1987. This publication was developed with assistance provided by three other
United States Air Force Security Specialist Interns -- Greg Chavez, Susan
Olsen, and Scott Wobbe. Special thanks go to them for their persistence in
bringing this project to a successful conclusion and for their commitment
to excellence.
Preface The hostile intelligence threat arrayed against the United States is
pervasive and sobering and confronts the government and our nation’s
industry with increasingly serious challenges. The threat spans all types
of intelligence operations to include traditional human espionage, the
most sophisticated electronic devices, and technology transfers. Every
kind of sensitive information is vulnerable, including classified
government information, industries emerging scientific and technological
(S&T) breakthroughs and unclassified military related technical data. Over the past two decades, the United States has increased reliance on
the industrial sector for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
of intricate components for major weapon systems, and command, control,
communications and intelligence systems. This shift from government RDT&E
to industrial RDT&E has also shifted the direction of hostile
intelligence service collection efforts. Espionage cases over the past ten
years (involving such industry personnel as Boyce, Bell, Schuler, Harper,
and Cavanagh), and the discovery of a growth in incidents of illicit
technology transfer, reflect this trend. Hostile intelligence services depend to a large degree on their human
collection networks throughout the world to satisfy their requirements for
U.S. advanced technology. The agents who steal most of the U.S. classified
information through espionage are not foreign nationals, legal or illegal,
but Americans already employed in sensitive positions. These persons are
recruited, or volunteer, to provide information to the hostile
intelligence service. The Western lead in many key technological areas has been reduced by a
Soviet commitment of enormous resources to acquire open-source
information, unclassified but proprietary information, and high technology
equipment that the West has agreed not to export to the Soviet Bloc. Hostile intelligence services also monitor many U.S. domestic
telecommunications channels, including most satellite links and certain
ground-to-ground transmissions. While the risk to military secrets from
poor communications security is widely understood, the U.S. industrial
community is also highly vulnerable. Taken together, the damage to national security from espionage,
technology theft and electronic surveillance amounts to a staggering loss
of S&T information to hostile intelligence services. As an open
society, the United States allows its’ adversaries unfettered access to
vast amounts of information that must be shared widely so that our
political system functions democratically and the process of free
scientific inquiry is most productive. The United States must respond to this threat through a combination of
the effective use of government counterintelligence operations to detect
and neutralize hostile intelligence forces, and industrial security
countermeasures. Sources
of Threat Among foreign intelligence services, those of the Soviet Union
represent by far the most significant intelligence threat in terms of
size, ability and intent to act against U.S. industry. The activities of
the Warsaw Pact and Cuban intelligence services are primarily significant
to the degree that they support the objectives of the Soviets. The threat
from intelligence activities by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is
also significant. Soviet Union The principal elements that spearhead the Soviet intelligence services
(SIS), the Committee for State Security (KGB) and Chief Directorate for
Intelligence (GRU), are most often assigned to the United States under
"official" cover at the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C., the
Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, and the Soviet Mission to the United
Nations in New York City. The United Nations employs approximately 300
Soviet nationals as international civil servants. Approximately one-fourth
of the Soviets in the Secretariat in New York are considered to be
intelligence officers, and many others are co-optees who have been told to
respond to KGB and GRU requests for assistance. The openness of our society permits the Soviets to acquire much of the
information their Military Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Presidium of
the Council of Ministers has identified for collection through
non-clandestine means. This collection is carried out through diplomatic
activities, trade representatives, visitors, students, and through the
open exploitation of readily available sources of desired information,
such as public libraries and technical data banks. Soviet intelligence has made extensive use of East-West exchange
programs (EWEP). Soviet EWEP participants generally fall into two
categories: 1) Soviet Exchange Scholars studying or conducting research at
American colleges and universities; and 2) Soviet delegations, including
Soviet scientists, businessmen, and scholars/academicians temporarily
visiting the United States to attend various scientific, academic,
business and cultural symposiums. Tasking generally includes gathering S&T information as well as
spotting and assessing potential recruits among American scientists and
Soviet emigrees. The Soviet scientist, technician, or student visiting the
United States is often in the best position to serve SIS interests simply
by virtue of his or her expertise in a given field, and the freedom of
movement and accessibility to information on American technology and
technical personnel. While Soviet intelligence co-opts a significant
number of legitimate scholars to act in an intelligence gathering
capacity, the KGB and GRU also fill a number of these positions with their
own personnel. Finally, there are their American agents, who provide access to
classified national security information and unclassified military related
S&T information which is not accessible to the Soviets themselves.
Most recent Soviet intelligence successes in penetrating the U.S. industry
appear to originate from these "volunteers." Soviet intelligence
continues to expend considerable manpower, time, and resources to spot,
cultivate, and recruit Americans with access to classified or sensitive
information -- particularly overseas. The Soviet methods used to acquire S&T information depend largely
on the cost and risk involved. It is likely that increased controls on
trade with the Soviets and on Soviet visitors and official personnel will
cause changes in Soviet collection techniques. Thus, more use of
clandestine methods and surrogate intelligence services to acquire
technology is likely. Soviet Use of Surrogate
Intelligence Services The intelligence services of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Hungary and Cuba act as surrogates for Soviet intelligence.
While a member of the Warsaw Pact, Romania has looser ties to the Soviets
in the intelligence arena. Thus, travel of Warsaw Pact and Cuban
intelligence personnel is often clearly related to Soviet intelligence
objectives. Bulgaria A substantial percentage of the approximately 84 Bulgarian officials in
New York City and in the Bulgarian Embassy in Washington D.C. are
considered to be known or suspected of affiliation with Bulgarian
intelligence services (BIS). To further Bulgarian collection requirements,
the BIS frequently exploits the roughly 1,000 annual Bulgarian visitors to
the United States. The principal Bulgarian target has been embargoed
technology. Czechoslovakia A significant number of the approximately 144 officials assigned by the
Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic to diplomatic and commercial
establishments in New York City; Charlotte, North Carolina; New Orleans,
Louisiana; and the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington D.C. are considered
to be known or suspected of affiliation with the Czechoslovak intelligence
service (CIS). The CIS have been aggressive in conducting intelligence
operations in the United States, particularly in making contacts with U.S.
citizens. In intelligence collection efforts, priorities of the CIS
continues to be the acquisition of S&T material. German Democratic Republic
(GDR) The East German intelligence services (ECIS) historically have used
visiting illegals (posing as businessmen and students/scholars) in
executing its intelligence operations. The central focus of the ECIS
collection continues to be the acquisition of a broad variety of
scientific and advanced dual-use technology. Hungary There are approximately 110 Hungarian officials stationed throughout
establishments in New York City; the Hungarian Embassy in Washington D.C.;
and small commercial offices in Chicago, Los Angeles, Newark, and
Columbus, Ohio. The Hungarian intelligence service (HIS) is significantly
represented among these officials and continues to concentrate on the
S&T fields. Poland A significant percentage of the approximately 300 Polish officials
currently assigned to the United States has been identified as known or
suspected Polish intelligence officers. In conducting their intelligence
operations, they have unquestionably used and exploited their freedom to
travel within the United States to engage in espionage activities against
the U.S. military and industrial sector. Romania There are approximately 72 official Romanian representatives in the
United States, located predominately in New York City. Some of these 72
officials have known or suspected affiliation with the Romanian
intelligence services (RIS). The Romanians in the United States do not
concentrate as much of their intelligence efforts to the collection of
highly sensitive S&T information. However, they remain a threat as
they continue to travel within the United States for intelligence
purposes. Cuba The Government of Cuba (GOC) is represented in the United States by
approximately 127 individuals at the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the
United Nations in New York City and the Cuban Interests Section in
Washington, D.C. This includes a significant percentage of officials with
known or suspected affiliation with the Cuban intelligence services (CUIS).
Cuban intelligence officers are in frequent contact with U.S. citizens,
mainly to lobby against the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. People’s Republic of
China The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has several intelligence
services whose personnel are represented among the approximately 1,500
Chinese diplomats and commercial representatives located at some 70 PRC
establishments and offices in the United States. They also have some
access to the approximately 15,000 Chinese students and 10,000 individuals
arriving in 2,700 delegations each year. PRC intelligence also seeks to
exploit the large ethnic Chinese community. The PRC services concentrate
primarily on S&T Information not approved for foreign release. Other Countries Because North Korea, Vietnam, and Nicaragua have only a limited
official presence in the United States, their intelligence activities pose
a lesser, but still significant threat to U.S. interests. Many other countries -- hostile, allied, friendly and neutral -- engage
in intelligence operations in the United States. While these activities
cannot be ignored, they do not represent a comparable threat. Dual-Use
Equipment and Technology Targeted By Hostile Intelligence Services In order to improve the technical levels and performance of weapons and
defense manufacturing equipment, hostile intelligence services seek to
obtain the following military and dual-use hardware, blue-prints, product
samples and test equipment: Microelectronics
Types
of Threat The following are the legal and illegal methods by which an
intelligence service may collect U.S. scientific and dual-use technology: Legal • Purchases • Licenses (Justifications are revealing) • Patents and Copyrights (Technical support
data is detailed) • Contracts, Bids and Proposals (Technology
compromised when promoted for economic benefit) • Joint Ventures and Co-production
Agreements (Significant information may be disclosed to foreign
intelligence services using Soviet bloc commercial entities in the United
States. These commercial establishments include the USSRS AMTORG and
INTOURIST, the Polish-American Machinery Company (Polamco), and similar
East German, Czechoslovak and other East European entities. Altogether,
nearly 70 U.S. chartered corporations, although owned by Warsaw Pact
countries, function legally as U.S. corporations and thus are subject to
few restrictions on acquiring technologies. However, these Warsaw Pact
country owned corporations are subject to the same export restrictions as
U.S. owned corporations. East Europeans employed by these firms are not
subject to travel controls or notice requirements.) • Purchase of Manufacturing Plants
(Turnkey) Technical Agreements • Scientific Exchanges • Student and Commercial Exchanges and
Cultural Visitors (Some 2,000 Soviets come to the United States each year
under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of
Trade, the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and other
Soviet agencies. Among their educational and cultural responsibilities,
they also collect overt information from nondefense industries and
classified and proprietary data in response to intelligence tasking on
behalf of military research projects. The number of U.S. universities and
institutes subject to focused Soviet efforts reportedly increased from 20
to 60 from the late 1970s to the early 1980s.) • Scientific, Technical and Academic
Conferences and Exhibits (Soviet trade or scientific representatives
travel to California about four times a month in delegations ranging from
two to ten people, supplementing the 41 person staff of the Soviet San
Francisco Consulate. It is reasonable to assume that 30 to 40 percent of
the personnel in a Soviet visiting delegation are intelligence officers
and/or co-optees. Thus, the Soviets are able to target more intensively
the 1,500 high-technology companies in the "Silicon Valley,"
which constitutes the largest collection of electronics and computer
manufacturers in the United States.) • Industrial Tours • Publications (Scientific, Commercial,
Textbooks, Sales Brochures, Congressional) • Immigration • Captured Weapons • Loose Talk Illegal The illegal hostile intelligence threat can be divided into two
categories; the human side and the wide array of technical collection
operations. Human Intelligence Threat (HUMINT) The HUMINT dimension begins with the trained intelligence officer
dispatched under official or nonofficial cover to operate abroad,
Intelligence officers are tasked to recruit U.S. military, government, and
contractor personnel in addition to co-opting other members of their own
government and citizenry for particular assignments. Persons with direct
or even indirect access to sensitive or classified information are the
prime targets of any foreign intelligence service operating against the
United States. In general, the hostile intelligence HUMINT operations fall
into the following categories: Legals, Illegals, Co-Optees, and Agents as
defined under Definitions. The possibility of being targeted for HUMINT exploitation increases
outside of the United States where foreign intelligence services are less
vulnerable to U.S. counterintelligence detection. Their operations may be
bolder since the target, an American civilian or military member, is on
unfamiliar ground and may be more easily approached, entrapped, and
exploited. Recruitment Approaches Hostile intelligence services begin the agent recruitment process by
scrupulously collecting information on persons who are connected to
industry, RDT&E laboratories, government institution staffs, military
bases, and design organizations. A candidate for recruitment usually fulfills the following criteria: -- They must be in a position to provide
information of real use to the hostile intelligence service, either to
steal or copy S&T information, to communicate secret information by
word of mouth, or to recruit new agents. -- There must exist motives by means of which
an individual can be recruited: -- Financial Consideration/Greed (Transcends
all other motives) -- Revenge/Disaffection -- Blackmail/Hostage Situations (Used in USSR
but very infrequently in U.S.) -- Appeal to Emigrees National Pride -- Exploitation of an Emotional Involvement -- False Flag Approaches -- Exploitation of an American’s Naivete -- Sex -- Ideology (Not the motivation it once was.
Soviets now concentrate on sympathy for "persecuted" elements of
American society) After the selection of a candidate for recruitment, the first stage,
tracing and cultivating, commences. Details are collected about the
candidate, details which may be obtained through reference, books,
telephone directories, the press, and other recruited agents. Further
definition of motives which will be used in the actual recruitment of the
person are cultivated and weaknesses are exacerbated. After the cultivation stage, overt contact is established with the
candidate under the guise of an official meeting. After the
acquaintanceship has ripened and official meetings evolve into personal
meetings, the developmental stage begins. The developmental stage cements
the relationship and encourages loyalty to it. The hostile intelligence
officer may then, through friendly persuasion, ask for a very innocent and
insignificant favor from the candidate and pay him generously for it, thus
placing the candidate in a position of obligation. During this stage the
future agent becomes accustomed to being asked favors and fulfilling them
accurately. The future agent’s ambitions, financial and work problems,
hobbies, etc., are continuously assessed by an intelligence team to
exacerbate weaknesses. The future agent’s professional, social, and
private personalities are soon stripped away. By degrees the tasks become more complicated, but the payment for them
grows equally, in many cases the actual recruitment proposal is never
made, as the candidate gradually becomes an agent of the hostile
intelligence service without fully realizing it. He may consider that he
is simply doing his business and doing favors for a good friend. The
candidate will find that all means of extricating himself have been cut
off, and that he is deeply ensnared in espionage work. The final stage is the recruitment stage, where the relationship moves
from overt to covert. The tasks become more serious but the payments for
them gradually decreases, This is done on the pretext of the agent’s own
security. In actuality, the agent is no longer in a position to negotiate
fees for his information, he is trapped. There is a more dangerous type of agent than the person who has been
ensnared in espionage work; this agent is the volunteer who walks into a
foreign embassy and asks to be recruited. Volunteers who are "warmly
welcomed" do not take into consideration the fact that they are
despised by hostile intelligence agents. A quote from a former Soviet GRU
intelligence officer who defected to the West offers the following
insight: "The Soviet operational officer,
having seen a great deal of the ugly face of communism, very frequently
feels the utmost repulsion to those who sell themselves to it willingly.
And when a GRU or KGB officer decides to break with his criminal
organization, something which fortunately happens quite often, the first
thing he will do is try to expose the hated volunteer." Technical Collection Operations Hostile intelligence services use the full range of intelligence
gathering technologies, to include the interception of communications,
electronic surveillance, collection of emanations from equipment,
penetration of computer systems, photoreconnaissance, and collection of
S&T information from the United States. -- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): The
Soviet interception of U.S. communications represents a significant threat
to the United States. By monitoring telephones and radio transmissions,
Soviet technical service groups can obtain S&T information from a
variety of locations and a fleet of intelligence collection vessels and
merchant ships that operate worldwide -- including off both coasts of the
United States. Today the discipline of SIGINT also encompasses the collection of
electronic signals of all kinds, such as radar and equipment emanations,
telemetry from weapons testing, and microwave transmissions sent via
microwave towers and satellites. SIGINT also includes the penetration of computer systems. Over the past
decade, the Soviets have acquired over 300 different types of U.S. and
other Western computer hardware and software, which has enabled them to
develop the technical ability to penetrate at least some of the U.S.
automated systems. -- Imagery: The final category
of technical intelligence collection is photographic or imagery
intelligence -- collection by means of overhead satellites, commercial
aircraft, or hand held devices against industrial RDT&E grounds or
military targets. Countering
the Threat In order to assist the industrial sector in countering the hostile
intelligence threat and in protecting classified government information
along with industry’s emerging S&T breakthroughs, the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary Defense (Policy) provides valuable guidance in DoD
5220.22-M, "Industrial Security Manual (ISM) for Safeguarding
Classified Information," September 1987. The ISM is available
through the contractor’s local Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
cognizant security office. In addition to the ISM, further guidance is
provided in the following supplements: -- DoD 5220.22-S-1, "COMSEC
Supplement to Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information," March 1988. -- DoD 5220.22-S-2, "Marking
Supplement to Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information," September 1987. -- DoD 5220.22-C, "Carrier Supplement
to Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information,"
October 1986. Provided the contractor has a contract (DD Form 254) specifying access
to classified COMSEC material and a facility clearance of Secret or above,
the following Tempest guidance is also available from the contractor’s
local DIS cognizant security office: -- NACSI 5004, National COMSEC
Instruction, Tempest Countermeasures for Facilities Within the United
States (U), January 1984. -- NACSI 5005, National COMSEC
Instruction, Tempest Countermeasures for Facilities Outside the United
States (U), January 1984. The Naval Publications and Forms Center (NPFC) and National Technical
Information Service (NTIS) have the following directives and regulations
available for additional guidance: Technology Control -- DoD Directive 5230.24, "Distribution
Statements on Technical Documents," March 18, 1987. (NPFC) -- DoD Directive 5230.25, "Withholding
of Unclassified Technical Data from Public Release," November 6,
1984, (NPFC) -- DoD 5230.25-PH, "Control of
Unclassified Technical Data With Military or Space Application,"
May 1985. (NTIS) -- DoD 3200.12-R-4, "Domestic
Technology Transfer Program Regulation (USDA)," April 1985. (NTIS) -- DoD 2040.2(D), "International
Transfer of Technology, Goods, Services, and Munitions," Change
1, January 17, 1984. (NPFC) Communication Security (COMSEC) -- DoD 5210.74, "Security of Defense
Contractor Communications," June 26, 1985. (NPFC) Written requests for individual copies should be submitted to:
All requests must include personal or company name and complete mailing
address (street address or P.O. Box number, city, state and zip code). The Department of Defense Security Institute (DoDSI) also provides the
following security awareness publications upon request: -- (SAM) Soviet Acquisition of Military
Significant Western Technology: An Update. September 1985. Detailed
description of Soviet efforts to obtain Western high technology, by fair
and foul means. Includes details on types of technology sought and Defense
contractor firms, listed by name, which the Soviets have targeted. -- (REC) Recent Espionage Cases: Summaries
and Sources. Updated periodically. Forty-three cases, 1979 to 1986,
"Thumb-nail" summaries and open source citations. -- (HIT) Hostile Intelligence Threat to
U.S. Industry: An Assessment for the Defense Industrial Security Program.
January 1981. By DODSI Staff. -- (FTB) Foreign Travel Briefing.
1981. Script of briefing designed for cleared employee’s traveling to
communist-controlled countries. Outlines methods used by hostile
intelligence services and precautions against them. -- (TAS) Training Aids for Security
Education. Updated periodically. Catalog of audiovisual and printed
material of interest to security educators, Instructions for ordering. -- Back issues of DODSI Security Awareness
Bulletins are also available, For a complete and updated list of back
issues, reference a current copy of the Security Awareness Bulletin or
write DODSI at: Department of Defense Security Institute When ordering the above publications from DODSI, please include the
codes located before the publication title. Reproduction of publications
is authorized unless otherwise specified, Please enclose a self-addressed
mailing label (no postage required) and include your nine digit Zip Code. Reporting
Attempted Contacts If an individual has contacts with representatives from the Soviet
Union, Warsaw Pact countries, Cuba, People’s Republic of China, or other
designated countries, there are a number of defensive steps that can be
taken. The most important step is to report all such contacts (official,
work-related, social, and professional) to a Security Officer who can
monitor the contacts to protect the employee’s record. The Security Officer should be recognized as an ally and not an
adversary. His job is to minimize damage that results from the loss of
sensitive information, protect employees from getting ensnarled in
situations involving hostile intelligence services, and to extricate them
when necessary, This service cannot be rendered if the employee remains
silent, It is much better for an employee to reveal a suspected
relationship voluntarily than have it come to light in the course of an
investigation. In sum, if an employee becomes involved in a compromising
situation, the sooner he consults his Security officer, the better for all
concerned: the employee, the employer, and the United States. In situations where an employee cannot or, for some reason, does not
want to contact his Security officer, the FBI can also be contacted. In
the United States, the FBI is as close as the nearest telephone. Abroad,
the nearest U.S. diplomatic establishment can arrange to put an employee
in touch with appropriate U.S. Government security officials. Any attempt
by untrained or uninformed persons to take on hostile intelligence
approaches single-handedly could result not only in personal disaster, but
may also interfere with current counterintelligence efforts. In addition to analyzing reported hostile intelligence approaches and
proposing courses of action, the FBI also provides a Defense
Counterintelligence Awareness (DECA) program which informs contractor
employees about current signs and techniques of local recruitment
attempts. The purpose of the DECA briefing is to sensitize the contractor
employees to the vulnerabilities of having access to classified and
sensitive S&T information. The following agencies provide security and counterintelligence
assistance to counter the hostile intelligence threat: • Program Manager • Installation Security Office • Local Discognizant Security Office • Applicable Local Military Service
Counterintelligence Organizations: -- U.S. Air Force Office Special
Investigations (0S1) Telephone: • Local FBI Office • Personnel with information of a positive
counterintelligence nature [may also contact the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA): -- Commercial: (202) 695-0361 Where appropriate, arrangements can be made to ensure caller anonymity. Definitions Agent: An American or third-country national recruited for
current operational purposes or, in some cases as "sleepers" to
be activated at a later date. Classified Defense Information: Official information requiring
protection in the interest of national defense, classified Top Secret,
Secret, or Confidential according to DoD 5200.7-R, "Information
Security Program Regulation," or designated Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) according to DoD TS-5 105.2 1-M-2 or DoD
TS-51 05.21-M-3 Contact: Any form of meeting, association, or communication; in
person, by radio, telephone, letter or other means, regardless of who
initiated the contact or whether it was for social, official, private, or
other reasons with a citizen or entity of a communist,
communist-controlled, or designated country. A contact has occurred even
if no official information was discussed or requested. Controlled Information: That information which bears a
distribution limitation statement from DoD Directive 5230.24, "Distribution
Statements on Technical Documents" or that information which is
being marked "For Official Use Only" in accordance with Chapter
IV of DoD 5400.7-R, "DoD Freedom of Information Act Program." Co-Optee: Foreign official or visitor tasked to do particular
tasks, such as spotting potential recruits or servicing drops. Many
diplomatic officials are co-opted, as are many official visitors and
emigres. Counterintelligence: Information gathered and activities
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers,
organizations, or persons; or international terrorist activities excluding
personnel, physical, document, and communications security programs. Counterintelligence Investigation: Includes inquiries and other
activities undertaken to determine whether a particular person is acting
for or on behalf of a foreign power for the purpose of espionage or other
intelligence activities, sabotage, assassinations, international terrorist
activities, and actions to neutralize such acts. Criminal Subversion: Criminal Subversion is defined in 18 U.S.C.
2387 as inciting military or civilian personnel of the Department of
Defense to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt
military activities, with the willful intent thereby to interfere with, or
impair the loyalty, morale, or discipline of the military forces of the
United States. Deliberate Compromise of Classified Information: Instances in
which classified defense information is or could be compromised as a
result of willful disclosure to an unauthorized person. Entity: Any embassy, consulate, trade, press, airline, cultural,
tourist, or business office, or any organization representing a communist,
communist-controlled, or designated country. Espionage: As set forth in 18 U.S.C. 792-798, in general: a. Espionage is the act of obtaining,
delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about
the national defense with an intent or reason to believe that the
information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation. The offense of espionage applies in time
of war or peace. b. The statute makes it an offense to gather,
with the requisite intent or belief, national defense information, by
going upon, entering, flying over, or obtaining access by any means to any
installation or place used by the United States in connection with
national defense. The method of gathering information is immaterial. c. Anyone who lawfully or unlawfully is
entrusted with or otherwise has possession of, access to, or control over
information about national defense which he or she has reason to believe
could be used against the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, and willfully communicates or transmits, or attempts to
communicate or transmit, such information to any person not entitled to
receive it, is guilty of espionage. d. Anyone entrusted with or having lawful
possession or control of information pertaining to the national defense,
who through gross negligence permits the same to be lost, stolen,
abstracted, destroyed, removed from its proper place of custody, or
delivered to anyone in violation of this trust, is guilty of espionage. e. If two or more persons conspire to commit
and one of them commits an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy,
all members of the conspiracy may be punished for violation of the
Espionage Act. Illegals: Trained intelligence officers sent abroad, often with
false identities, who maintain no overt contact with their government.
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